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Abstract
A kidney exchange is a centrally-administered
barter market where patients swap their willing yet
incompatible donors. Modern kidney exchanges
use 2-cycles, 3-cycles, and chains initiated by non-
directed donors (altruists who are willing to give
a kidney to anyone) as the means for swapping.
We propose significant generalizations to kidney
exchange. We allow more than one donor to do-
nate in exchange for their desired patient receiv-
ing a kidney. We also allow for the possibility of
a donor willing to donate if any of a number of pa-
tients receive kidneys. Furthermore, we combine
these notions and generalize them. The general-
ization is to exchange among organ clubs, where
a club is willing to donate organs outside the club
if and only if the club receives organs from out-
side the club according to given specifications. We
prove that unlike in the standard model, the un-
capped clearing problem is NP-complete. We also
present the notion of operation frames that can be
used to sequence the operations across batches, and
present integer programming formulations for the
market clearing problems for these new types of
organ exchanges. Experiments show that in the
single-donation setting, operation frames improve
planning by 34%–51%. Allowing up to two donors
to donate in exchange for one kidney donated to
their designated patient yields a further increase in
social welfare.
1 Introduction
Kidney transplantation is the most effective treatment for kid-
ney failure. However, the demand for donor kidneys far ex-
ceeds the supply. The United Network for Organ Sharing
(UNOS) reported that as of October 28th, 2016, the waiting
list for kidney transplant had 99,382 patients.
Roughly two thirds of transplanted kidneys are sourced
from cadavers, while the remaining one third come from will-
ing healthy living donors. Patients who are fortunate enough
to find a willing living donor must still contend with compat-
ibility issues, including blood and tissue type biological com-
patibility. If a willing donor is incompatible with a patient,
the transplantation cannot take place.
This is where kidney exchange comes in. A kidney ex-
change is a centrally-administered barter market where pa-
tients swap their willing yet incompatible donors. Modern
kidney exchanges use 2-cycles, 3-cycles, and chains initiated
by non-directed donors (altruists who are willing to give a
kidney to anyone) as the means for swapping.
The idea of kidney exchange was introduced by Rapa-
port [1986], and the first organized kidney exchanges started
around 2003 [Roth et al., 2004; 2005]. Today there are kid-
ney exchanges in the US, Canada, UK, the Netherlands, Aus-
tralia, and many other countries. In the US, around 10% of
live-donor kidney transplants now take place via exchanges.
Kidney exchanges started as matching markets where one
donor-patient pair would give to, and receive from, another
donor-patient pair. In other words, 2-cycles [Roth et al.,
2005] were the structures used. Then, kidney exchange was
generalized to also use 3-cycles [Roth et al., 2007], and
then short and finally never-ending chains initiated by non-
directed donors (altruists who are willing to give to any-
one without needing an organ in return) [Roth et al., 2006;
Rees et al., 2009].
Significant work has been invested into scaling the market
clearing algorithms, that is, the algorithms that find the opti-
mal combination of non-overlapping (because any one donor
can give at most one kidney) cycles and chains [Abraham et
al., 2007; Constantino et al., 2013; Manlove and O’Malley,
2015; Anderson et al., 2015b; Dickerson et al., 2016].
We propose a significantly generalized, more expressive,
approach to kidney exchange. We allow more than one donor
to donate in exchange for their desired patient receiving a kid-
ney. We also allow for the possibility of a donor willing to
donate if any of a number of patients receive kidneys. Fur-
thermore, we combine these notions and generalize them.
Our generalization can be formalized around the concept
of exchange among organ clubs, where, roughly speaking, a
club is willing to donate organs outside the club if and only
if the club receives organs from outside the club according
to given specifications. More specifically, exchange clubs
extend the notion of a donor-pair pair, allowing for a set of
healthy donors equally willing to donate one of their kidneys
in exchange for an equal (or greater) number of kidneys re-
ceived by a target set of patients.
ar
X
iv
:1
70
5.
09
32
8v
1 
 [c
s.G
T]
  2
5 M
ay
 20
17
Forms of organ clubs already exist—under an arrangement
where one gets to be in the club as a potential recipient if one
is willing to donate one’s organs to the club upon death. For
example, there was such a club called LifeSharers in the US
for several years [Hennessey, 2006]. It shut down in 2016
amid controversy regarding whether an organ club would ac-
tually hurt the nationwide organ allocation. Similarly, there is
an organ club in the military “that allows families of active-
duty troops to stipulate that their loved ones’ organs go to
another military patient or family [Kime, 2016].” Also, Israel
started an organ club where those who have given consent
to become organ donors upon death (or whose family mem-
bers have donated an organ in the past) get priority on the
organ waitlist if they need organs; this increased organ do-
nation in Israel by 60% in just one year [Stoler et al., 2016;
Ofri, 2012]. One way to think of the approach that we are
proposing is as an inter-club exchange mechanism that in-
creases systemwide good—and can also be applied to live
donation.
Our approach is beneficial also in a setting where there are
no organ clubs in the traditional sense. We will nevertheless
find the notion of a club useful in a technical sense to define
the constraints, as we will detail later. We propose a formal-
ization of this new kind of organ exchange, and propose an
organ exchange approach where clubs are conceptually the
primary agents—whether they are actually clubs, altruists, or
donor-patient pairs, or a combination thereof. We support
both intra-club and inter-club donations. We prove that un-
like in the standard model, the uncapped clearing problem is
NP-complete.
To address the issues that (1) a club (of which a donor-
patient pair is a special case, as is an altruist donor) wants to
receive no later than it gives, and (2) there are logistical limits
as to how many operations can be conducted simultaneously,
we introduce the concept of operation frames. They provide a
convenient framework for handling the problem of synchro-
nizing different transplants, by imposing a partial order on
them. We propose a linear integer program for this.
Experiments show that in the single-donation setting, op-
eration frames improve planning by 34%–51%. Allowing up
to two donors to donate in exchange for one kidney donated
to their designated patient yields a further welfare increase.
2 The Standard Model
Today’s kidney exchanges (and other modern barter ex-
changes) can be modeled as follows. There is a directed
compatibility graph G = (V,E), where vertices represent
participating parties and edges representing potential transac-
tions [Roth et al., 2007; Abraham et al., 2007]. In the kid-
ney exchange context, the set of vertices V is partitioned as
V = Vp ∪ Vn, where Vp is the set of donor-patient pairs, and
Vn is the set of non-directed donors (NDDs).
For sake of simplicity, we will consider all non-directed
donor vertices as formal donor-patient pairs, where the pa-
tient is an artificial object—denoted by ⊥—that is incom-
patible with any donor in the system. Vertices u and v are
connected by a directed edge u→ v if the donor in u is com-
patible with the patient in v. The exchange administrator can
also define a weight function w : E → R representing, for
each edge e = (u, v) ∈ E, the underlying quality or priority
given to a potential transplant from u→ v.
Given the model above, we wish to solve the clearing
problem, that is, we wish to select some subset of edges
with maximum total weight subject to underlying feasibility
constraints. For example, a donor d in a donor-patient pair
v = (d, p) ∈ Vp will donate a kidney if and only if a kid-
ney is allocated to his or her paired patient p. Non-directed
donors have no such constraint. In the model described so far,
any solution consists of only two kinds of structure:
• chains, that is paths in G initiated by NDDs and then
consisting entirely of donor-patient pairs; and
• cycles, that is loops in G consisting of vertices in Vp—
and not non-directed donors in Vn.
Furthermore, in any feasible solution, these structures cannot
share vertices: no donor can give more than one kidney.
In kidney exchange, a length cap L is imposed on cycles
for logistical reasons. All transplants in a cycle must be per-
formed simultaneously so that no donor can back out after
his patient has received a kidney but before he has donated
his kidney. In most fielded exchanges worldwide, L = 3, so
only 2-cycles and 3-cycles are allowed.
Chains do not need to be constrained in length, because it is
not necessary to enforce that all transplants in the chain occur
simultaneously. There is a chance that a donor backs out of
her commitment to donate, but this event is less catastrophic
than the equivalent in cycles. Indeed, a donor backing out in a
cycle results in some other patient in the pool losing his donor
while not receiving a kidney—that is, a participant in the pool
is strictly worse off than before—while a donor backing out
in a chain simply results in the chain ending. While that latter
case is unfortunate, no participant in the pool is strictly worse
off than before. In practice, however, a chain length cap is
used, in order to make the planned solution more robust to
last-minute failures [Dickerson et al., 2012b; 2016].
The problem can be formulated as an integer program to
find the optimal solution, and indeed there has been sig-
nificant work on developing increasingly scalable integer
programming algorithms and formulations for this problem
(e.g., [Roth et al., 2007; Abraham et al., 2007]). The state of
the art formulation is called PICEF [Dickerson et al., 2016].
Its number of variables is polynomial in chain length cap and
exponential in cycle length cap, which is not a problem in
practice because the latter cap is small. Furthermore, the LP
relaxation is very tight, causing good upper bounding in the
search tree and therefore fast run time.
3 Exchange Clubs as a Modeling Construct
We propose significant generalizations to (kidney) exchange.
We allow more than one donor to donate in exchange for their
desired patient receiving a kidney. We also allow for the pos-
sibility of a donor willing to donate if any of a number of
patients receive kidneys. Furthermore, we combine these no-
tions and generalize them. We formalize this by introducing
the modeling concept of exchange clubs.
Definition 1. (Exchange club) An exchange club c is a tuple
(Dc, Pc, αc, γc) composed of
• a (possibly empty) set of donors Dc;
• a (possibly empty) set of patients Pc;
• a real αc ≥ 1 called “matching multiplier”. Intuitively,
this means that for each matched patient in Pc, the club
is willing to donate (in expectation) αc kidneys to the
pool;
• a real γc ≥ 0 called “matching debt”.
The idea of exchange clubs is that donors in Dc are willing
to donate kidneys only if doing so results in a tangible benefit
(that is, kidneys donated) to patients in Pc. More precisely, let
nextd (t) be the number of kidneys donated from donors in Dc
to clubs other that c by time t, and let nextp (t) be the number
of kidneys donated from donors outside of c to patients in Pc;
then the following inequality must hold for all time t in order
for club c to be willing to participate in the solution:
nextd (t) ≤ αcnextp (t) + γc (1)
For now, we ignore parameter γc, whose role and motivation
will become clear later.
We can now formalize the uncapped generalized clearing
problem as follows.
Definition 2. (Disjoint clubs) We say that two exchange
clubs c and c′ are disjoint if Pc∩Pc′ = ∅ andDc∩Dc′ = ∅.
Problem 1. (Uncapped generalized clearing problem) Let
C be a set of mutually disjoint exchange clubs; let D =
∪c∈CDc and P = ∪c∈CPc denote the overall set of donors
and patients respectively. Furthermore, let E ⊆ D × P be
the set of compatibility edges, and let w : E → R a weight-
ing function assigning a weight to every compatibility edge.
We want to find a set of edges that maximizes the sum of
weights and satisfies Inequality 1 assuming all the selected
transplants occur simultaneously.
Matching Debts. We now explain the meaning of γc. Sup-
pose a number nextp of patients in club c receive kidneys from
other clubs, and that the optimal solution of the problem re-
quires that nextd donors from club c donate a kidney to other
clubs. If nextd < αcn
ext
p , we say that club c owes αcn
ext
p − nextd
kidneys to the system. This is exactly the meaning of the
“matching debt” of a club. It reflects the sum of all debts that
a club has cumulated in the past. Except for clubs defined by
non-directed donors (which start with a debt of 1), each club
typically starts with a debt of 0 at the beginning, and poten-
tially increases or decreases its debt to the system over time.
The kidney exchange pool changes over time as the ex-
change conducts transplants. Debts allow the exchange to
keep track of the state, which is then used as the input in the
next optimization.
3.1 The Standard Model is a Special Case
The (uncapped) standard model is a special case of our
model:
• each non-directed donor defines a club c with no patient,
and where he or she is the only donor. Furthermore, the
club has γc = 1 (the value of αc is irrelevant);
• each (d, p) donor-patient pair in the standard models de-
fines a club c, where Dc = {d}, Pc = {p} and αc = 1.
At the same time, our new model allows for some impor-
tant generalizations. For instance, consider the case where
one patient p has a set of two donors both willing to donate a
kidney in exchange for only one kidney donated to p. In this
case, the two donors and p form a club with αc = 2.
The introduction of exchange clubs as a modeling construct
calls for a different representation of the problem because the
traditional donor-patient pairs cannot capture all the new as-
pects. Therefore, we explicitly represent donors and patients
as different types of vertices in the graph. Figure 1 illustrates
this under the further assumption that αc = 1, γc = 0 for all
clubs. We represent donor vertices with a square and patient
vertices with a circle. Observe that in Figure 1 it is not pos-
sible to extend the given solution with an edge from Donor 8
to Patient 7, as doing so would violate Inequality 1: Club D
does not receive any kidney from other clubs, and therefore it
cannot be asked to donate.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Donors
Patients
A B C D
Clubs
Figure 1: Tiny example problem instance. Vertical dashed lines sep-
arate different exchange clubs (so that, for instance, the first club
has D1 = {1, 2, 3}, P1 = {1, 2}). Solid edges show a solution.
Dashed edges represent unused compatibilities. This figure assumes
αc = 1, γc = 0 for all four clubs.
3.2 Uncapped Problem Formulation
It is not clear how one could apply an integer program for-
mulation like the state-of-the-art PICEF formulation for the
standard kidney exchange problem [Dickerson et al., 2016]
in this new setting. This is because, in our setting, the fea-
sibility (in the sense of Inequality 1) of a particular donation
depends on what transplants have already been conducted. It
does not seem immediate how such aspects could be encoded
in a formulation like PICEF. However, one can easily write an
integer linear program for the uncapped clearing problem that
selects edges so as to maximize total weight of the selected
edges subject to satisfying Constraint 1.
Theorem 1 shows that the decision problem associated with
this problem is is NP-complete. This is in stark contrast to the
standard model where the uncapped version can be solved in
polynomial time [Abraham et al., 2007]. This increase in
hardness is the cost of our increased expressiveness.
Theorem 1. The decision problem associated with the un-
capped generalized clearing problem is NP-complete.
Proof sketch. Membership in NP: Given a set of mutually
disjoint exchange clubs C and set of k trades, it is trival to
check in polynomial time if they satisfy Inequality 1.
NP-hardness: We reduce from SET-PACKING (SP). An in-
stance of SP takes a set of items U , a family S of subsets of
U , and an integer k as input; the task is to find a disjoint sub-
family X ⊆ S such that |X | = k.
Assume that we are given an instance of SP. We will now
build an instance of our problem. Let n = |U| be the number
of items and m = |S| be the number of subsets. Index the
items {u1, . . . , un} ∈ U and the subsets {S1, . . . , Sm} ∈ S.
Construct a disjoint set of clubs C as follows. For each ui ∈
U , construct a club ai with no patient, one donor, and γai = 1.
For each subset Sj ∈ S, construct a club cj with one patient
and no donor. Furthermore, for each subset Sj , construct a
club bj with one donor and ` = |Sj | patients, γbj = 0, and
αbj = 1/`. Intuitively, this club will donate its one kidney iff
each of the ` patients receives a kidney.
We now specify the set of legal transplants. LetM = |U|+
1. For each subset Sj ∈ S , draw a directed edge with weight
M from the single donor in club bj to the single patient in
club cj . Furthermore, for each item ui ∈ U and subset Sj ∈
S such that ui ∈ Sj , draw one directed edge with weight 1
from the single donor in club ai to the patient corresponding
to item ui in club bj . Figure 2 shows the final construction.
Universe set:
{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}
Set packing instance:
S1 {1, 3, 4}
S2 {1, 3, 5, 7}
S3 {4, 6}
(a)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
M M MS1 S2 S3
(b)
Figure 2: (b) Constructed instance of our problem. Each nodes rep-
resents a club, with donors in the top part, and patients in the bottom
part. Edges represent compatibilities.
We will now show that a solution exists for the instance
of SC if and only if our problem has a legal matching with
weight in [kM, (k + 1)M).
(⇒) Suppose there exists some solution S ′ = {S′1, . . . , S′k}
to the SP problem; that is, there exists some disjoint subfam-
ily of S of size k. Then, for each subset S′j ∈ S ′, for each
element ui in S′j , use the edge from club ai to club bj . By the
disjointness of the subfamily S ′, each single-donor club ai for
i ∈ [n] donates to at most one club. Furthermore, each club
bj corresponding to S′j ∈ S ′ receives one kidney for each pa-
tient in its club; by construction, their matching multiplier is
now satisfied. Thus, for each S′j ∈ S ′, include the edge with
weight M from the one donor in bj to the one patient in cj .
This results in a matching of weight at least kM , but no more
than kM + n < (k + 1)M .
(⇐) Suppose there exists a matching in our problem such that
the weight of the matching is in [kM, (k + 1)M). Then ex-
actly k of the edges between exactly k pairs of clubs b· and c·
are used, at total weight kM . Let j′ ∈ [m′] index those clubs
bj′ that use their one outgoing edge to club cj′ . Each club bj′
uses that edge if and only if every one of its internal patients
receives a kidney; since each single-donor club a· can give at
most one kidney, they are used at most once. Since at most
n clubs a· can be used, each at additional weight 1, the final
matching is of weight at most km+ n < (k + 1)M ; further,
exactly k clubs bj′ were fulfilled completely, corresponding
to exactly k disjoint subsets Sj′ ∈ S being packed.
4 Operation Frames
While the above modeling approach is promising, it has a
major shortcoming: it might require that a potentially large
number of operations happen at the same time so as to honor
the condition that the donors not be operated on strictly
before patients in their clubs receive kidneys. An exam-
ple is provided in Figure 3, where we would need patients
{1, 2, 3, 6, 7} and donors {1, 2, 3, 5, 6} to be operated on at
the same time.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Donors
Patients
A B C D E F
Clubs
Figure 3: Example that requires 5 simultaneous transplants.
This is not practically viable for at least two reasons:
• the success probability of all the planned transplants
in the structure succeeding in their pre-operation blood
type compatibility tests (aka. crossmatch test) and other
pre-transplant testing decreases multiplicatively with the
number of edges in the planned structure,1 and
• the logistic (and financial) details are hard to execute—
ten people to operate on have to be coordinated, together
with the surgeons and staff needed for ten surgeries.
In order to solve this synchronization issue, we introduce the
concept of operation frames. An operation frame t is an edge
set of size up to Kt, representing operations to be performed
at the same time. The introduction of operation frames en-
ables us to reason in terms of order in which the operations
will be carried out. The chronological order imposed on the
operation frames is partial. For this reason, we can formalize
the set and relationships among operation frames by means of
a directed acyclic graph (DAG) F = (T,B), where the set of
vertices (i.e., T ) coincides with the set of operation frames,
while the set of edges B ⊆ T × T denotes the happens-
strictly-before chronological (partial) order. We say that op-
eration frame u happens strictly before operation frame v, de-
noted u v, if there exists a directed path in F from u to v.
The introduction of operation frames enables Inequality 1
to be written in terms of logical time, that is, substituting the
notion of time with the partial happens-strictly-before order.
Thus, for any frame τ ∈ T , the number of kidneys that were
surely (i.e., for any possible linearization of the DAG F ) do-
nated to and from club c at the time when τ is executed is
nd(τ) =
∑
τ ′ τ d(c, τ
′), np(τ) =
∑
τ ′ τ p(c, τ
′), where
d(c, τ ′) and p(c, τ ′) represent the number of transplants from
and to club c scheduled for operation frame τ ′.
We argue that operation frames provide a richer problem
structure, as it is now possible to assign a (partial) chronolog-
ical order to the operations we plan to perform. Furthermore,
they encode the condition that “no more than Kt people get
1For further details about pre-transplant test failures, see Dicker-
son, Procaccia, and Sandholm [2013] and Blum et al. [2015].
operated on at the same time” in a very natural way: every op-
erating frame has a parameter Kt. Indeed, operation frames
guarantee that not too many surgeries are planned to happen
at the same time. Conceptually, they are equivalent to im-
posing chain and cycle length caps, as it is done in standard
model. However, here we are allowing much richer exchange
structures (and, as presented so far, there is no way of speci-
fying a different cap on the size of chains versus cycles versus
other structures). This is because the operation frame size cap
Kt represents an actual limit on the number of simultaneous
operations that can be accommodated. Different frames can
have different size constraints.
Finally, operation frames allow an integer programming
formulation of the problem that (unlike PICEF) uses a num-
ber of variables that is polynomial in the maximum size cap
maxtKt. We present that formulation in the next section.
4.1 Capped Problem Formulation
The idea of operation frames can be plugged into the un-
capped integer program, leading to the following formulation.
d(c, ⌧ 0) and p(c, ⌧ 0) represent the number of transplants from
and to club c scheduled for operation frame ⌧ 0.
We argue that operation frames provide a richer problem
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ber of variables that is polynomial in the maximum size cap
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4.1 Capped Problem Formulation
The idea of operation frames can be plugged into the un-
capped integer program, leading to the following formulation.
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X
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8 c 2 C,
t 2 T
4
X
(d,p)2E
xtdp  K 8 t 2 T
5 xtdp 2 {0, 1} 8 (d, p) 2 E,
t 2 T
Formulation 1: MIP formulation for the capped problem.
We let xtdp be a binary value (Constraint 5 ) indicating
whether the transplant represented by the edge (d, p) 2 E is
scheduled for operation frame t. Analogous to the uncapped
case, Constraints 1 and 2 ensure that each donor donates
at most one kidney and that each patient receives at most one
kidney, respectively. Constraint 4 ensures that in any oper-
ation frame t 2 T , no more than K transplants are sched-
uled. Constraint 3 enforces that at any time t, for each club
c 2 C, the total number of kidneys donated from club c does
not exceed b c + ↵cnextp (t)c, where nextp (t) is the total num-
ber of kidneys donated to club c from other clubs, before or
at operation frame t. The objective function ensures that a
maximum-weight solution is found.2
4.2 Operation Frames Counter Myopia
Present-day kidney exchanges operate in a batch setting, po-
tentially planning in a single shot long chains that will, in
practice, execute in segments over many months. Solvers
for the standard problem (e.g., those based on PICEF) op-
timize on a batch-by-batch basis, selecting the global opti-
mum solution only inside of a single batch, and not consider-
ing future batches. Our approach is more powerful than the
standard batch-based one also in the sense that it inherently
breaks long structures into shorter ones that execute sequen-
tially. Figure 4 shows an example compatibility graph where
our model will return a higher-value solution than the optimal
solution in the traditional model.
Figure 4: An example graph where Formulation 1 returns a
higher-value solution than the standard batch approach, even
with only the standard kinds of vertices available. Given a
cap K = 2, the standard approach will choose the lower 2-
chain over the upper 2-chain for utility 3, while our solver
will choose to match the upper 3-chain across two frames for
greater overall utility of 6.
Figure 1 shows that the capped approach in the standard
model cannot consider certain solutions; yet, our capped
approach—based on the concept of operations frames—
optimizes across all the operation frames at the same time,
resulting in less myopic behavior. Under the assumption that
the kidney exchange pool is not affected by any exogenous
behavior (e.g., compatibility failures, deaths of donors or pa-
tients, dynamic insertions and deletions of edges and ver-
tices), our formulation is guaranteed to find a globally op-
timal allocation of transplants across all operation frames. In
contrast, even under these strong assumptions, present-day
solvers for the standard model will (by design) fail to find a
globally optimal solution across batches.
5 Experiments
We conducted experiments to evaluate the techniques. The
experiments are conducted using the real data from the UNOS
kidney exchange that started in 2010. In that data we have
the vertices that have a patient and one or more donors, and
2One can also model temporal preferences by multiplying the
edge weights by discounts h(t), which depend on which operation
frame t the surgery is conducted. (This assumes that the time be-
tween frames is exogenous—but not necessarily constant—that is,
the time between frames does not depend on what transplants the
optimizer decides to put in each frame.) This discounting is already
include in the objective in Formulation 1.
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ber of kidneys donated to club c from other clubs, before or
at operation frame t. The objective function ensures that a
maximum-weight solution is found.2
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the time between frames does not depend on what transplants the
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dard approach will choose the lower 2-chain over the upper 2-chain
for utility 3, while our solver will choose to match the upper 3-chain
across two frames for greater overall utility of 6.
Figure 1 shows that the capped approach in the standard
model cannot consider certain solutions; yet, our capped
approach—based on the concept of operations frames—
optimizes across all the operation frames at the same time,
resulting in less myopic behavior. Under the assumption that
th kidn y exchange pool is not aff cted by any exogenous
behavior (e.g., compatibility failures, deaths of donors or pa-
tients, dynamic insertions and deletions of edges and ver-
tices), our formulation is guaranteed to find a globally op-
timal allocation of tr nsplants acro s all operation frames. In
contrast, even under these strong assumptions, present-day
solvers for the standard model will (by design) fail to find a
globally optimal solution across batches.
5 Experime ts
We conducted xperim nts t evaluate the techniques. The
experiments are conducted using the real data from the UNOS
kidney exchange that started in 2010. In that data we have
the vertices that have a patient and one or more donors, and
vertices that represent altruists. We also have patient and
onor attributes, nd we u e the UNOS rules for determin-
ing compatibility of potential transplants (these rules take into
account blood type, tissue type, creatinine, acceptable trans-
plant centers, etc). So, in this master data set we effectively
have a graph that has as its vertices all the vertices that have
been in the UNOS exchange. All edges have unit weight.
Also, around 70% of edges in kidney exchanges fail due to
various pre-transplant tests, so the planned transplant cannot
occur after all [Dickerson et al., 2013]. We take this into ac-
count by randomly removing 70% of the edges independently
from the master graph. In each experiment, we subsample
optimizer decides to put in each frame.) This discounting is already
include in the objective in Formulation 1.
vertices from this master graph (and keep the edges between
the selected vertices) to generate multiple problem instances,
i.e., input graphs. For each value of the pool size, we repeat
the experiment with 50 different random seeds. The operation
frames DAG was chosen to be a total order.
The first experiment compares the standard model (Sec-
tion 3.1) to our capped operation-frame-based model. In both
cases, at most one donor from each pair is used. In both cases,
the cap is four; this is a conservative experimental design be-
cause often in the standard model cycles are further capped to
be at most length three, which would disadvantage the stan-
dard model compared to our approach. In both cases, we sam-
ple around 5% of the vertices to be altruists from the mas-
ter graph and the rest are sampled uniformly from the non-
altruist vertices. Figure 5 shows that our approach yields a
34%–51% improvement via better—less myopic—planning
even in this static setting.
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Figure 5: Improvement in the number of matches from the capped
operation frame approach over the standard approach. Diamond
marks denote averages, the horizontal line in the box the median,
the box edges the first and third quartiles, and the whiskers the min-
imum and maximum across the points.
In the UNOS pool, 5.7% of the non-altruist vertices have
multiple willing donors, but at most one from each vertex
will be used. The second experiment is exactly like the first,
except that in the capped operation-frame-based model, up to
two of the donors from each vertex can be used (i.e., αc = 2
for clubs c that have more than one donor). Figure 6 shows
that this leads to a larger increase over the standard approach.
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Figure 6: Improvement in the number of matches from the capped
operation-frame approach over the standard approach when up to
two donors can be used from each non-altruist vertex in the former
approach.
In the third experiment we sample more multi-donor
pairs—roughly 10% of the entire pool. We do this to test how
the system would perform if more multi-donor pairs would be
present—as is conceivable in the future as knowledge about
kidney exchange spreads and possibly also as multiple donors
could actually be used. Figure 7 shows that allowing for up to
two donors to be used from a vertex leads to an improvement
over allowing only up to one to be used. In both cases, we
use our capped operation-frame approach.
50 100 150 200 250 300
+0%
+5%
+10%
+15%
+20%
Pool size (number of clubs)
R
el
at
iv
e
im
pr
ov
em
en
t
Figure 7: Improvement in the number of matches from allowing up
to two donors to be used from each vertex compared to allowing
only one donor from each vertex to be used.
6 Conclusions and Future Research
Motivated by the reality of fielded kidney exchanges, in
this paper we proposed significant generalizations to kid-
ney exchange—and barter markets more generally. Specifi-
cally, we moved the model from individual and independent
patient-donor pairs to the modeling concept of multi-donor
and multi-patient organ clubs, where a club is willing to do-
nate organs outside the club if and only if the club receives
organs from outside the club according to expressed prefer-
ences. We proved that unlike in the standard model, the un-
capped clearing problem is NP-complete.
We presented the notion of operation frames that sequence
the operations across batches, and gave IP formulations that
optimally clear these new types of markets. Experiments
show that in the single-donation setting, operation frames im-
prove planning by 34%–51%. Allowing up to two donors to
donate in exchange for one kidney donated to their designated
patient yields a further increase in social welfare.
Operation frames include a notion of time via the happens-
before ordering; yet, this does not capture the full dynam-
ics of kidney exchange, where vertices and edges arrive and
disappear over time. Finding an optimal matching policy
for fully dynamic kidney exchange is an open problem from
both the theoretical [U¨nver, 2010; Akbarpour et al., 2014;
Anderson, 2014; Anderson et al., 2015a] and computa-
tional [Awasthi and Sandholm, 2009; Dickerson et al., 2012a;
2013; Dickerson and Sandholm, 2015; Glorie et al., 2015]
points of view. Perhaps operation frames—with or without
clubs—can be used to enhance planning even in those con-
texts as we showed it can in the static setting.
Exploring incentive issues in this new model is also inter-
esting. Generalizations to the basic kidney exchange model
have already enabled mechanisms that circumvent strong im-
possibility results [Hajaj et al., 2015; Ashlagi and Roth, 2014;
Ashlagi et al., 2015; Toulis and Parkes, 2011]. The more ex-
pressive models presented in this paper could similarly result
in advances in mechanism design.
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A Appendix A: Limited Horizon
Approximation
Fielded kidney exchanges routinely solve NP-hard problems
when matching patients to donors. The models we presented
here, being generalizations of the standard kidney exchange
model, are also solving an NP-hard problem. We presented
MIP formulations to solve these models, but—by virtue of
being intractable from a complexity theory point of view—it
is the case that certain inputs exist that will make these for-
mulations run slowly. In the event that MIP Formulation 1
takes too much time, it is possible to consider the following
algorithm:
1. Solve the problem above with T = {1, . . . , T˜}, where
T˜ is small;
2. Remove the matched structures, update the matching
debts γc for all clubs;
3. Repeat steps 1-2 until no more matches are found.
This is halfway between the batch-based approach (typical of
the standard model) and the full version of Formulation 1.
B Appendix B: Overview of PICEF
In this section, we briefly overview the Position-Indexed
Chain-Edge Formulation (PICEF), the current state-of-the-
art approach to optimally clearing traditional batch, single-
donor-single-patient kidney exchanges [Dickerson et al.,
2016]. PICEF is an IP formulation that uses one binary
variable for each cycle in a compatibility graph, but uses
binary variables for only the edges in chains, not for each
chain itself—of which there would be too many to even
write down in memory. The intuition for this representa-
tion was drawn from earlier algorithms based on the prize-
collecting traveling salesperson problem (PC-TSP) [Ander-
son et al., 2015b], and on prior “edge formulation”-style al-
gorithms [Constantino et al., 2013].
The innovation of PICEF was the use of position indices
on edge variables, which results in polynomial counts of both
constraints and variables (assuming a constant cycle cap but
non-constant chain cap, which is realistic); this is in stark
contrast to the exponential number of constraints in the PC-
TSP-based model.
We first define an index set K′(i, j), the set of possible
positions at which edge (i, j) may occur in a chain in the
compatibility graph G. Given a maximum chain length K
(which can be a constant or allowed to rise with |Vp|), for
i, j ∈ V such that (i, j) ∈ E,
K′(i, j) =
{{1} i ∈ Vn
{2, . . . ,K} i ∈ Vp .
Any edge leaving a non-directed donor v ∈ Vn can only be
in position 1 of a chain, and any edge leaving a patient-donor
vertex in Vp may be in any position up to the chain-length cap
K, except 1—that is, it cannot trigger a chain.
For each (i, j) ∈ E and each k ∈ K′(i, j), create variable
yijk, which takes value 1 if and only if edge (i, j) is selected
at position k of some chain. For each cycle c inG of length up
to L, define a binary variable zc to indicate whether c is used
in a packing. Then we can define the formal PICEF model,
shown in Formulation 2.
max
∑
(i,j)∈E
∑
k∈K′(i,j)
wijyijk
+
∑
c∈C(L,0)
wczc (2a)
s.t.
∑
j:(j,i)∈E
∑
k∈K′(j,i)
yjik
+
∑
c∈C(L,0):i appears in c
zc ≤ 1 i ∈ Vp
(2b)∑
j:(i,j)∈E
yij1 ≤ 1 i ∈ Vn
(2c)∑
j:(j,i)∈E∧
k∈K′(j,i)
yjik ≥
∑
j:(i,j)∈E
yi,j,k+1
i ∈ Vp,
k ∈ {1, . . . ,K − 1}
(2d)
yijk ∈ {0, 1}
(i, j) ∈ E,
k ∈ K′(i, j)
(2e)
zc ∈ {0, 1} c ∈ C(L, 0)
(2f)
Formulation 2: PICEF formulation.
Inequality (2b) is the capacity constraint for patients: each
patient vertex is involved in at most one chosen cycle or in-
coming edge of a chain. Inequality (2c) is the capacity con-
straint for altruists: each altruist vertex is involved in at most
one chosen outgoing edge. The flow inequality (2d) ensures
that patient-donor pair vertex i has an outgoing edge at posi-
tion k+1 of a selected chain only if i has an incoming edge at
position k; we use an inequality rather than an equality since
the final vertex of a chain will have an incoming edge but no
outgoing edge.
Code for the PICEF model can be found at the
jamestrimble/kidney solver repo on Github. For
more information on this model, and for theoretical and ex-
perimental results regarding its correctness and efficacy, we
direct the reader to the published paper [Dickerson et al.,
2016].
